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,..,.efore, if you have clients involved in any type of 
manufacturing, agriculture, or  marketing, they should 
already be asking you how certain developments in inter- 
national trade law will affect their business. For example, 
how might they benefit from the creation of a tariff-free 
market of over 300 million consumers and sharply 
increased agricultural exports to Mexico under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)? 
This article offers a framework for answering such ques- 
tions, especially if your clients have not yet asked them. 
Specifically, it sketches out certain key developments in 
the legal rules governing international trade. It highlights 
recent changes in bilateral and multilateral trade pacts, tar- 
iff breaks, export licensing, and export financing. More 
importantly, particularly for the nonspecialist, the article 
identifies some overall trends that Kansas businesses, 
investors, and financial institutions should know about in 
order to plan successful strategies for the years ahead. 
I. BACKGROUND - THE GATT's "MULTILATERALI- 
ZATIONn OF INTERNATIONAL TRADING RULES 
Understanding recent developments in international 
trading rules requires an awareness of the overall context 
in which these developments are occurring. That context 
begins with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)4 and its effort to "multilateralize" trade rules - 
that is, to replace bilateral trading rules and relationships 
with a global regime aimed at benefitting all participating 
countries. 
A. Economic and Political Foundations o f  the GA'IT 
' 
According to the economic theory of competitive advan- 
tage, all countries benefit from free trade. A country 
should concentrate pro- 
The countries emerging duction in those items in 
which it has a compara- as victors believed that tive advantage and trade 
World War II bad result- with other countries that 
ed in part froom an inter- produce goods in which 
thev have a com~arative 
national eC0n0miC order ad;antage, tie close 
gone haywire. of world War 11, this the- 
ory had gained general 
acceptance among the governments of Western countries, 
including the United States. 
Corresponding to that shared economic theory was a 
shared political belief. The countries emerging as victors 
believed that World War I1 had resulted in part from an 
international economic order gone haywire. It was an 
order plagued by high tariff barriers, competitive devalua- 
tions of currencies, and economic conditions in Europe 
that had become too chaotic to attract investment. To 
avoid another world war, the theory went, would require 
a new international economic order with three indispens- 
able elements: 
a multilateral system of binding rules governing inter- 
national trade, with emphasis on cutting tariff levels 
and removing other barriers to trade that had marked 
the inter-war period; 
a stable monetary system with predictable exchange 
rates, in contrast to the competitive devaluations of 
the inter-war period, in order to facilitate trade; and 
a financing system by which the post-war wealth of 
the United States could be channeled into profitable 
investments overseas, especially for the reconstruc- 
tion of war-ravaged Europe. This would also ensure 
strong markets for U.S. goods as the U.S. economy 
moved from wartime to peacetime. 
In order to create and manage these three systems, 
three new international organizations were envisioned: 
the International Trade Organization (ITO), the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, respec- 
tively. The World Bank and the IMF were created at the 
Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, organized and con- 
ducted mainly by representatives of the Allied powers. 
The ITO, however, was never created. For political rea- 
sons related to the Cold War, the United States failed to 
agree to the proposed IT0 charter. 
The gap created by the absence of an IT0 has been 
partially filled by the GATT. Originally intended merely 
as a treaty to implement the results of some tariff negotia- 
tions in 1947, the GATT in fact has been applied "provi- 
sionally" for over 40 years. More than 100 countries rep- 
resenting at least 90 percent of all world trade have 
become members (technically, Contracting Parties) of the 
GATT. 
B. The Three Main Principles o f  the GATT 
Nondiscrimination and MFN Treatment. Competi- 
tive escalation of tariff levels during the inter-war period 
was marked by discrimination on  a country-by-country 
basis. Article I of the GATT disallows such discrimina- 
tion: tariff duties imposed by a GATT member country on 
a particular item must be uniform for all imports of that 
item from all other GATT member countries. In the terms 
of the GATT, "most-favored nation" (MFN) treatment is to 
be accorded to all other GATT members. MFN treatment 
is not, as the term implies, a special preference given to 
only one or a few countries. Instead, it is the standard 
treatment given to most trading partners, "the trade equiv- 
alent of diplomatic  relation^."^ 
Prohibition o f  Non-Tariff Barriers. In order to avoid 
end-runs around the GATT's intent, Article XI and other 
provisions prohibit (with some exceptions) the use of 
quotas or other non-tariff barriers to trade. The GATT 
approach is to specify tariffs as the only legitimate type of 
trade barrier, and then to negotiate reductions in general 
tariff levels over time. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, u'onc. Oct. 30, 5. 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (RNA) 1332 ( ~ u g .  5, 1992) hereinafter 
T. I .A.S.  No 1700, 55 I!.h'.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, Iml. 
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Bound Duty Rates. Article I1 refers to "schedules of ther reductions. As a result, the overall level of tariffs 
concessions." These represent commitments made after among GATT members has fallen dramatically. Instead of 
negotiation by each GATT member as to the maximum duties of 40 percent, 60 percent, or even 100 percent. 
tariff duty rates that it will impose on particular products average tariff levels for trade between GATT members fol- 
imported from other GATT members. A country may set lowing the Tokyo Round were largely under 10 peron-+ 
its tariff levels lower than specified ceilings but cannot For example, those tariffs averaged 5.6 percent fc 
exceed the ceilings unless special exceptions apply. United States, 7.2 percent for the European Comm 
The importance of these three GATT principles in oper- 4.9 percent for Japan, and 8.9 percent for Canada.6 
ation appears in the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the 
United States. The tariff schedules were previously codi- B. Erosion of the  Non-Discrimination Principle 
fied at 19 U.S.C. $1202, but they change so often that the The GATT's non-discrimination principle has, over 
International Trade Commission now issues them in suffered numerous slings and arrows. Preferential treat- 
looseleaf form. The tariff schedules provide a classifica- ment is overtaking MFN treatment. Such preferential treat- 
tion for every item imported into the United States and ment has taken two main forms: regional trading arrange- 
prescribe a tariff duty rate for each classification. A client ments such as those in Europe and North America, 
wishing to import an item will need to determine the special tariff breaks for imports from less developed cc 
applicable tariff from the tariff schedules. The client will tries. 
want to select a supplier in a country that has MFN treat- Regional Trading Regimes. Article XMV of the G1 
ment (usually through GATT membership) or in a country permits members to create a "free trade area." M 
that receives some special preferential treatment (see favorable treatment may 
below). be given to imports from p referential treatmeni 
A concrete example will illustrate the significance of the participants in that 
MFN treatment. Assume a Wichita manufacturer of wid- area, so long as the treat- ~ ~ a M n g M F N ~ a ~ ~  
gets needs to install ceiling fans in its warehouse. If ment given to imports 
imported, the ceiling fans would probably come into the from nonparticipants in that area is no less favorable than 
United States classified under item 8414.51.0030 on the that applicable before the creation of the area. For many 
tariff schedules. Under that classification, if the fans years the main regional trading regime has been the Euro- 
come from a country with MFN status (from Japan, for pean Community (EC). Through a complex set of ( 
example), a tariff of 4.7 percent would have to be paid stituent agreements, the EC aims to eliminate "inter 
on the value of each ceiling fan, unless some preferential customs duties, to maintain a common external tariff, 
tariff scheme applies. If the fans come from a country to eliminate quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff 
without MFN status (from Cuba, for example), a much barriers.' 
higher tariff of 35 percent would have to be paid. More recently, the US.-Canada Free Trade Agrec 
(USCFTA)8 established the same kind of GATT 
11. THE GATT AT WORK - THE GOOD, THE BAD, regional trade regime with preferential treatmel 
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND goods traded between the two participants. Becat 
Since its creation in the late 1940s, the GATT has large- the USCFTA, the Wichita widget manufacturer imp 
ly met its goal of reducing tariff levels. In recent years, ceiling fans from Canada would face a tariff of on 
however, economic and political developments have percent, compared with the tariff of 4.7 percent for 
taken their toll, especially on the GATT's key principle of imported from regular MFN-status countries. 
nondiscrimination. The GATT's future rests largely on the Special Tariff Breaks for Developing Countr 
outcome of the latest round of trade negotiations, called The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) represl 
the Uruguay Round, now in its seventh troubled year. So another departure from the GATT's nondiscrimina~ 
far, prospects for success look dim. principle. The interest of European states in providing 
preferential tariff treatment to imports from former 
A. Results o f  Earlier Rounds o f  Negotiations colonies ripened in the 1970s into a call for a general 
The most visible GATT activity has been the sponsor- GATT stamp of approval for such treatment. Undc 
ship of eight "rounds" of multilateral negotiations on tar- U.S. version of the GSP,9 free entry or reduced 
iffs and other trade barriers. The first six rounds focused apply to most articles imported from less developed 
on reciprocal reductions in tariff rates. The seventh tries. For example, the Wichita manufacturer impor 
round, the "Tokyo Round" of the late 1970s, brought fur- 
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ceiling fans from a GSP beneficiary country would face no 
tariff at all on the fans. GSP beneficiaries include most 
African and Latin American countries, some Asian coun- 
tries, and now certain countries in eastern Europe. 
The U.S. GSP program expires in July 1993, unless 
renewed by Congress - by no means a foregone conclu- 
sion in today's political and economic climate.I0 If it is 
extended, the increasing complexity it brings to tariff clas- 
sification and country-of-origin determinations will further 
undermine the simplicity and  transparency that the 
G A T S  nondiscrimination principle was intended to cre- 
ate. 
C. The Uruguay Round - Resurrection or Requiem? 
The present round of GATT-sponsored trade negotia- 
tions is called the Uruguay Round because it was initiated 
by a GATT Ministerial Declaration at a 1986 meeting in 
Uruguay. It was intended to strengthen the GATT further, 
but so far it has failed, prompting some commentators to 
declare that the GATT is dead or dying. 
An Ambitious Agenda. The Uruguay Round has 
sought to achieve more than any previous round of nego- 
tiations. Of particular interest to the United States is the 
establishment of rules in two areas: protection of intellec- 
tual property against counterfeiting, and trade in services. 
The latter rules would ensure that the United States and 
other services-exporting countries get equal treatment, or 
at least fair treatment, for the provision of banking, insur- 
ance, and other services across borders. 
Another ambitious agenda item concerns agricultural 
subsidies. Although the GATT attempts in Article XVI to 
prohibit the use of most 
export subsidies, it effec- 
[7;lhe lack of progress in tively exempts from that 
recent months has left prohibition what it terms " 
many officials and "primary products." 
These include a~ricultur- - -- - " 
observers pessimistic al products. n u s ,  the 
about prospects for any agricultural export sub- 
sidy programs provided 
satisfactory conclusion by the U . S  
of the Uruguay Round a i d  the EC are not 
negotiations. inconsistent in principle 
with the GATT. At the 
Uruguay Round, howev- 
er, the United States has called for substantial reductions 
and eventual elimination of such subsidies. Beset with 
economic and political difficulties surrounding its efforts 
toward integration, the EC has insisted on retaining the 
heavy subsidies that it provides its agricultural sector. 
Present Status of the Uruguay Round. So far, the 
high hopes for the Uruguay Round have been dashed. 
Although the Bush administration and others have tried to 
give encouraging signs, the lack of progress in recent 
months has left many officials and observers pessimistic 
about prospects for any satisfactory conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Agricultural subsidies have emerged as the key sticking 
point. Proposals and counter-proposals have bounced 
around the negotiations, mainly between the United 
States and the EC. At a GATT ministerial meeting in late 
1990, negotiations broke down over the agriculture 
issue." Attempts to revive them continued through 1991. 
By year-end, attention had focused on the "Dunkel draft," 
a compromise text on the agriculture provisions under 
negotiation. Proposed by GATT Director General Arthur 
Dunkel, that draft would reduce farm subsidies within 
three years by amounts ranging from 20 percent to 36 
percent, depending on the type of support." The U.S. 
negotiators agreed to use the proposal as a basis for 
negotiations, but the EC rejected the Dunkel draft out- 
right. 
As this article went to press, 1992 was proving to be 
another year of grasping at straws. The following devel- 
opments are illustrative:I3 
In late March, talks between President Bush and Ger- 
man Chancellor Kohl failed to bring progress, and in 
April President Bush's exchange of new agriculture 
proposals with EC Commission President Jacques 
Delors failed to resolve the impasse. According to 
White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, the efforts 
had brought no "concrete progress ... in terms of 
changed positions or getting closer to an agreement." 
The July G-7 economic summit in MunichI4 concluded 
with a communique saying G-7 leaders "expect that 
an agreement can be reached before the end of 
1992," but little real progress was reported on agricul- 
ture, the main stumbling block. 
In late August, with NAFTA negotiations concluded 
(see part IIIB, below), U.S. Trade Representative 
Carla Hills reiterated that bringing the Uruguay Round 
talks to a successful conclusion remains a top priority 
for the United States. At about the same time, how- 
ever, GATT Director General Dunkel admitted that 
the talks are in "a deeply disappointing situation of 
deadlock." 
Expectations for a breakthrough in US.-EC negotia- 
tions rose and fell several times during October, and 
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ing the creation of a central bank and a single current): 
Prognosis. Considering the time and effort spent so by the beginning of 1999.'' Such a move would further 
far on the Uruguay Round, it appears unlikely that the consolidate Europe as a trading entity, bringing new chal- 
100-plus countries to the talks will simply throw in the lenges to American businesses wanting to trade with 
towel and walk away from the GATT process entirely. Europe. For the Wichita manufacturer of widgets, the 
On the other hand, there seems to be little hope now that treaty would mean facing tougher competition from Euro- 
the Uruguay Round will produce far-reaching agreements pean widget suppliers, whose trade within Europe not 
on all or most of the agenda items. Perhaps a reasonable only would be increasingly free of "internal" tariffs but 
prognosis for the next several months is that the Uruguay also would involve no exchange risk. 
Round will limp forward until a face-saving patch-up Thus far, the Maastricht Treaty has received mixed 
emerges, thereby keeping the GATT alive but no stronger reviews. Denmark is the only country that has rejected it 
than before, and maybe even weaker. In short, unless to date, but support in other EC countries is far from 
the Uruguay Round achieves some kind of breakthrough wholehearted. The closeness of the French vote in Sep- 
to reinvigorate the multilateral regime of trading rules, the tember - 51 percent in favor, 49 percent against - has 
recent momentum toward a "demultilateralization" of prompted a move to make the image, if not the content. 
trading rules and relations will probably continue to of the treaty more palatable. Full adoption of the treaty 
by the end of 1992 is now impossible. It seems clear. 
however, that the momentum toward greater economic 
III. THE "DEMULTILATERALUATION" OF INTERNA- union in Europe is nearly irreversible. The question is not 
TIONAL TRADING RULES whether it will come, but when and to what degree.IR 
"We are entering an era of economic blocs," a senior Of even more direct significance to trade is the estab- 
U.S. Chamber of Com- lishment of a vast single market of 380 million consumers 
A new era in trade rules merce official said in nineteen European countries - the twelve countries of 
recently. "Our member the EC and the seven countries of the European Free and re'ati0ns bas indeed companies are much Trade Area (EFTA)." Those countries signed in Mly r 
dawned, perhaps bring- more interested in [a] treaty to create a European Economic Area (EEA).20 It is 
ing with it an end to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada FTA to be ratified before the end of this year and take effect 
[free-trade agreement] beginning on January 1, 1993. 
" m ~ l t i l a t e r a l i ~ a t i o n "  and in =atin America Taken together, these recent developments in Europe 
period that the GATT than in any GATT agree- seem destined to continue the trade integration of that 
ment."15 Recent evi- region. Americans will face bigger challenges than ever in 
dence is overwhelming. vying for export deals there.z' Beyond that, a uni" ' 
A new era in trade rules Europe may wield more influence outside its border 
and relations has indeed dawned, perhaps bringing with it well. According to at least one observer, the powe 
an end to the "multilateralization" period that the GATT establish the rules of international trade is shifting f10111 
the United States to Europe. "Americans will have to learn 
to play a different ball game, one where Europeans writc 
A. Recent Developments in Europe all the rules."zz 
The past twelve months have seen some important 
steps toward economic consolidation in Europe. These B. Recent Developments  in North America - 
include the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the NAFTA 
European Economic Area. New rules are also being written, though, in this h~ 
In February, at the Dutch city of Maastricht, the twelve sphere. Based on the apparent success of the USC 
members of the EC signed the Treaty on  European (part 11. B., above), the NAFTA has come quickly into 
the 
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realm of the probable. By eliminating "internal" tariffs 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the 
NAFTA would bring the 360 million consumers of the 
North American continent together into one of the world's 
largest markets. The NAFTA officially became the subject 
of negotiations in June 1991, and by September 1992 an 
official text of the agreement had been negotiated and 
submitted to Congress. The President may sign the 
NAFTA as early as December 18.23 
Even without the NAFTA, Kansas exports to Mexico and 
Canada have almost doubled in the last five years and 
now account for a third of the state's total exports. 
Kansas exports to Mexico totalled roughly $260 million in 
1991, with agriculture representing the bulk of those 
exports. Exports to Canada, consisting mainly of food 
products, computers and machinery, and transportation 
equipment, totalled $519 million.z4 
Under the NAFTA, about 65 percent of U.S. industrial 
I and agricultural exports to Mexico would be eligible for 
I duty-free treatment either immediately (50 percent) or 
1 within five years (15 percent). As for agricultural trade 
generally, Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan has 
emphasized the NAFTA's potential rewards by saying that 
the increased exports of coarse grains and livestock prod- 
ucts to Mexico expected for 1992 are "just the tip of the 
iceberg" when compared with the agricultural export 
opportunities under the NAFTA.Z5 For the wheat trade 
specifically, Mexico would immediately remove its import 
licensing requirement in exchange for a 15 percent tariff, 
which would itself be phased out over ten years. 
Thus far, the NAFTA has received mixed reviews by 
agricultural interest groups. U.S. Wheat Associates, which 
represents wheat  boards in seventeen states, has 
expressed disappointment with the NAFTA because it 
does not address U.S. wheat growers' concerns about 
competition with Canadian wheat growers for the Mexican 
market. The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), 
however, has said that the NAFTA would generally benefit 
U.S. agriculture. The president of the AFBF has cited the 
fact that farm exports to Canada more than doubled in the 
first three years of free trade under the USCFTA.26 
The NAFTA, like the USCFTA, would cover some trade 
in services as well as goods. For example, the NAFTA 
would permit U.S. banks and securities firms to establish 
wholly owned Mexican subsidiaries. It would allow resi- 
dents of each of the three NAFTA countries to purchase 
financial services in the territory of another NAFTA coun- 
try. The NAFTA also addresses numerous other trade and 
business rnatter~.~' 
It is important to recognize that the NAFTA is intended 
by some as the second step in a longer journey, with the 
USCFTA having been the first step. The Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative, announced in June 1990, seeks ulti- 
mately to establish a free-trade system within the Western 
Hemisphere. Consistent with that goal, the Bush adminis- 
tration announced last 
May that it would 
negotiations on a 
trade agreement 
Open [Tlbe U.S. enthusiasm 
free- 
with for  regional trading 
Chile sGon after the regimes extends beyond 
V " 
NAFTA is c ~ m p l e t e d . ~ ~  
An "expansion" of the 
North America to  
NAFTA itself is already embrace the so-called 
being urged in some 6tpaCifiC ~ i ~ "  
quarters.29 
Indeed, the U.S. enthusiasm for regional trading 
regimes extends beyond North America to embrace the 
so-called "Pacific Rim." Bush administration officials say 
that an Asia-Pacific Rim free-trade area would comple- 
ment the NAFTA. Trade figures explain such a look west- 
ward. Annual U.S. trade across the Pacific already 
exceeds $300 billion, 40 percent more than U.S. trade 
across the Atlantic30 
W .  COUNTERTRENDS 
Despite the current crisis with the GATT and the corre- 
sponding rise of regional trading blocs, multilateral efforts 
do continue on several fronts. Moreover, the trend iden- 
tified above toward "demultilateralization" should not be 
read simply as "regionalization": many important new 
bilateral initiatives, especially by the United States, extend 
beyond this hemisphere. 
A. At the Multilateral Level 
Traditional cooperation among the Western countries 
regarding export controls for national security purposes 
has continued, and in fact strengthened, in the past year 
or  so. The Coordinating Committee on  Multilateral 
Export Controls, known as "COCOM," is the 17-nation 
group3I that maintains a list of countries prohibited from 
importing high-technology goods from the West. In 
recognition of the sweeping political changes occurring in 
Eastern Europe, COCOM completely rewrote its list of 
embargoed goods and technologies between June 1990 
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and May 1991. The resulting "Core List" contains only the 
most critical goods and technologies essential to main- 
taining military ~uperiority.'~ For U.S. business, this devel- 
opment "means a 50 percent reduction in existing export 
controls," being implemented by the issuance of a new 
Commerce Control List (previously called the Commodity 
Control List)." 
Multilateralism also appears on  another front. In 
addressing the overall economic problems of the former 
Soviet republics, several Western countries have called 
upon multilateral resources. Although full of fits and 
starts, the efforts to assist the republics in moving to a 
market-based economic system have benefitted from 
heavy involvement by the G-7 countries and by the 
World Bank and IMF. Most of the former Soviet republics 
were offered membership in those two organizations last 
April. 
With such membership comes the potential for eco- 
nomic development loans, subject to conditions calling 
for those countries to improve their economic structure 
and policies. If and when such improvements occur, 
trade opportunities for  American businesses might 
improve as well. For example, the Wichita widget manu- 
facturer might be able to secure a privileged foothold in 
an enormous market by getting in on the ground floor of 
economic development in one or more of the former 
Soviet republics. 
B. At the Bilateral Level - U.S. Initiatives 
While much of the recent non-multilateral focus of U.S. 
trade officials has been on the Western Hemisphere, and 
especially on the NAFTA,34 several bilateral initiatives of 
the past six months have improved opportunities for U.S. 
exporters in other countries as well. 
For example, U.S. officials announced last February that 
the United States would conclude separate bilateral trade 
agreements with Russia and the other former Soviet 
republics, using as a model the US.-Soviet trade agree- 
ment signed into law by President Bush in December 
1991.35 Since that time, several such trade agreements 
have been signed, generally providing for MFN treatment, 
meaning relatively low tariff levels.36 
Substantial support for U.S. trade and investment with 
the former Soviet republics will probably be channeled 
through the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), which 
provides export loans and guarantees, and throu~ 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
provides loans, loan guarantees, and political risk 
ance to U.S. investors. To encourage investment, o 
raised ceilings in April on Eximbank and OPIC support tor 
projects involving U.S. trade and investment in the former 
Soviet republics. By August, the Eximbank had arranged 
seven loan guarantees worth about $102 million.37 
In addition to these Eximbank and OPIC initiatives, cer- 
tain recent USDA initiatives should prove beneficial to 
Kansas agricultural inter- 
ests.  The US DA [Rlecent USDA initiatizles 
announced in August a 
major food aid initiative 
should prove beneficid 
to help ten former Soviet to Kansas agric~lturfll 
republics and several interests, 
other  countries, with 
wheat  expected to  be  
the major form of aid.'"n addition, Russia received $1.15 
billion in agricultural export credit guarantees and other 
aid in midSeptember. Half of the 1992-1993 U.S. wheat 
crop could be affected by the September White House 
announcement that a record-breaking 30 million metric 
tons of wheat will be offered to 28 countries under the 
export enhancement program.39 
The U.S. Government has also taken bilateral initiatives 
to improve trade opportunities in Asia, particularly in 
China, by pursuing legal and political agreement on 
numerous fronts. Results have been  mixed, with 
prospects for smooth trade relations fluctuating wildly in 
recent months. 
For example, in January 1992, China and the United 
States reached agreement on protection of intellectual 
property; and twice during 1992, China has retained MFN 
trade status with the United States when President Bush 
vetoed legislation that would have tied MFN status for 
China to progress on human rights and the export of mi<- 
sile t e c h n ~ l o g y . ~ ~  
US.-Chinese relations soured dramatically, howevt 
summer. First, failure of U.S. and Chinese negotiat 
resolve a market access dispute resulted in U.S. publica- 
tion of a list of nearly $4 billion worth of Chinese goods 
that would have been subject to punitive tariffs if China 
had refused to lower alleged barriers that keep U.S. gc 
out of China's markets. The threatened punitive tariff 
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els were high. For example, the Wichita widget maker 
importing ceiling fans from China would have paid a tariff 
of 100 percent instead of the 4.7 percent applicable with 
MFN treatmenL4' 
The U.S.-China trade dispute was resolved, however, in 
early October when the two countries reached agreement 
on a range of measures to open China's markets to U.S. 
goods and services. The measures include a lowering of 
Chinese tariffs on certain agricultural goods. The agree- 
ment also envisions China's readmission to the GATT, 
which could take place as early as next year.4z 
Other recent bilateral developments also might bring 
improved overseas trade opportunities for Kansas busi- 
nesses. For example, a September proposal by President 
Bush would create a global "strategic network" of bilateral 
trade agreements between the United States and certain 
Latin American countries, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslova- 
kia, and some Pacific Rim countries.43 
These and other bilateral initiatives by the United States 
have elicited harsh criticism from both the EC and the 
GATT. In September, EC officials denounced the "grow- 
ing unilateralism" in U.S. trade policies and predicted that 
the NAFTA would result in discrimination against EC firms 
located in NAFTA countries. Similar criticism came in a 
GATT secretariat report released last March, warning that 
basic GATT principles could be eroded by the U.S. policy 
of putting more faith and effort into bilateral and regional 
trade pacts than into improving the existing multilateral 
' V. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR KANSAS PRAC- 
I TITIONERS 
I The business of American import and export trade exists 
today in a changing environment. It is an environment 
that all Kansas practitioners, not just international trade 
specialists, should understand in order to serve their busi- 
ness clients. 
This article has focused on a major trend in the chang- 
mg environment of international trade law: the "demulti- 
lateralination" of international trading rules and activity. 
I Notwithstanding certain countertrends, the historical and 
a political progression revealed by events of the past few 
years and substantiated in recent months bodes ill for the 
multilateral, GATT-based approach to trade regulation and 
~ncentives. It bodes well for bilateral and regional 
' approaches. 
Translating the overall trend of "demultilateralization" 
into specifics suggests the following observations and 
predictions of relevance to Kansas practitioners and their 
business clients. 
NAFTA. The NAFTA process seems certain to go for- 
ward, and some agreement can be expected to take effect 
within the next several months. Although the NAFTA's 
overall goal is to improve trade opportunities in North 
America, Kansas practitioners will need to consider care- 
fully specific NAFTA provisions to determine their effects 
on the interests of particular clients. 
Fortress Europe? The EC, as well as the broader new 
European Economic Area, are likely to become more dif- 
ficult for U.S. traders to penetrate, at least for the next 
several years while European governments sort out issues 
of economic and monetary integration. In particular, 
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Bilateral initiatives. 
U.S. initiatives currently 
underway with large potential trading partners warrant 
attention. In particular, trade relations with China, the for- 
mer Soviet republics, and Eastern Europe all may ripen in 
coming months. In this respect, Kansas businesses might 
benefit (i) from new trade agreements struck with such 
countries, (ii) from further liberalization of export con- 
trols, and (iii) from expanding U.S. government support 
for exports through loan and guarantee programs.45 
It remains to be seen how the change to a Clinton 
administration in Washington will affect the pace and 
direction of the trends described above. One thing, how- 
ever, is certain. Most Kansas businesses cannot ignore 
the opportunities and challenges that international trade 
presents. For Kansas practitioners counseling those busi- 
nesses, questions of international trade law can no longer 
be considered entirely "foreign." . 
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